AFGHANISTAN MINORITY PROFILE
Profile
The Aimaq are mostly Sunni Muslim of the Hanafi branch, like the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and the Turkmen of Afghanistan. They speak a dialect of Persian mixed with Turkic vocabulary. While the Aimaq have traditionally been a nomadic people, they are gradually becoming semi-nomadic, travelling only in certain seasons. Their societal structure is based on the patriarchal nucleus family, which also defines their ethnic identity. Their main economic resource is carpet-weaving and, on a secondary basis, farming. Lacking in rich agricultural land some of them were nonetheless forced to choose to become farmers due to the drought in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite the main source of economic wealth resulting from carpet-weaving, Aimaq culture still measures wealth through the number of heads of livestock.
Historical context
Being a nomadic people, the Aimaq, divided into their different sub-groupings have traditionally traversed through the entirety of Afghanistan and Iran. They are credited with participation in the defence of the state against the Soviet invasion, as well as being active in the ensuing civil war, on the side of the Mujahadin. Being a relatively small though diverse group with no real territorial base, there has not been any claim from the Aimaq for self-determination.
Their tribal and nomadic character has acted as a barrier from them ever becoming politically active, nor have they sought administrative power in any concerted manner. As a result, they have lacked the means through which to communicate their main very fundamental concern of survival under very difficult conditions.
Current issues
In contrast with other communities in rural Afghanistan, Aimaq women are accorded high status and are able to participate in group discussions with outsiders present, and have some degree of choice over whom they marry.
Although a numerically small ethnic group, Aimaq have gained positions in parliament. However, some Aimaq have expressed concern that the voter identification process would not allow them to identify as Aimaq, and rather, the government was going to force them to identify themselves as belonging to other smaller ethnicities, accusing the government of applying divide and rule tactics.
Profile
Though their exact numbers are uncertain and as with other communities are contested, previous estimates have suggested that Baluchis make up around 2 per cent of the population. They are part of the larger Baluchi community, the majority of whom live across the border in Pakistan, and the rest live in Iran. The Baluchis of Afghanistan live in the pastoral lands of the south-west and south in Hilmand and Faryab Provinces and practise Sunni Islam. Their language is Baluchi, although some speak Brahui (who are known as Brahuis or Brahui Baluchis).
The Baluchis’ main economic activity is agriculture and animal husbandry. They are traditionally nomads and have preserved their ancient tribal structure with patriarchal, male-dominated kinship. Traditional and acquired skills have made them relatively self-sufficient, with the ability to build their own homes and develop the tools necessary for daily life. Rugs are woven for trade and household. Their farming activities follow a strict division of labour between women and men. Women work in groups threshing and separating the harvest while men are responsible for ploughing and planting. In keeping with Baluchi nomadic tradition, lands are not privately owned but belong to the whole tribe.
Historical context
Divided between three countries – Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan – the Baluchis are one of Asia’s classical cross-border minorities. They have a strong awareness of their ethnic identity which has resulted in several rebellions against their respective central governments in a bid to maintain their autonomy. While there has been a strong Baluchi pull for self-determination with the view to the formation of an independent Baluchistan, these demands have gradually faded through sustained political repression at the hands of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Unlike the Kurds’ struggle for independence the Baluchi struggle has rarely attracted attention in the outside world.
In the 1970s the strongest organised Baluch group in search of independence were the Baluch People’s Liberation Front (BPLF). Most PLF guerrillas were based in training camps in southern Afghanistan and were reportedly given sanctuary by Daoud’s regime.
Current issues
Baluchis are one of the named ‘national’ ethnic minorities in the Afghan Constitution. Accordingly, they have all the rights bestowed to Afghan citizens. Nevertheless, Baluch leaders have expressed concern that their rights to their language have not been protected by the government, and that their children do not receive mother-tongue language education.
Profile
The size of the Hazara population, as with other communities in Afghanistan, is highly uncertain as the country’s authorities have never conducted a national census of the population. However, it is broadly recognized that none of the country’s ethnic groups form a majority, and the exact percentages of each group as part of the national population are estimates and often highly politicized.
The size of the Hazara community has also declined significantly as a result of forced migration, land grabbing and persecution. They were once the largest Afghan ethnic group, constituting nearly two-thirds of the total population of the country before the 19th century. Some estimates suggest that more than half of the Hazaras were massacred, forced to flee or taken into slavery during the 1891-93 Hazara War when the Afghan King Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880-1901) led a genocidal campaign of violence against Hazaras. Many of the Hazaras who fled the persecution by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan settled in the Indian subcontinent or Iran, laying the foundation of the Hazara communities that now live in the Pakistani city of Quetta and various districts in Iran’s eastern provinces. These communities have increased in size as more Hazaras who fled from Afghanistan over the past four decades have settled within them, especially in Quetta.
The origins of the Hazara community are much debated. Although a common myth suggests that Hazaras originated from a contingent of the army of Genghis Khan in the 13th century, there is no historical evidence to support these claims. Other more plausible theories suggest that Hazaras are more likely to have descended from communities that inhabited the region well before the advent of Genghis Khan.
Hazaras speak a dialect of Dari (Farsi dialect) called Hazaragi and the majority of them follow the Shi’a (Twelver Imami) school of Islam. As a result, Shi’a Hazaras constitute a religious minority in a country where the majority practice Sunni Islam. Significant numbers of Hazaras are also followers of the Ismaili Shi’a school of Islam or are Sunni Muslims. Within Afghanistan, Hazaras are known for their distinctive music and literary traditions with a rich oral history, poetry and music. Hazaragi poetry and music are mainly folkloric, having been passed down orally through the generations.
In Afghanistan, the majority of Shi’a Hazaras live in Hazarajat (or ‘land of the Hazara’), which is situated in the rugged central mountainous core of Afghanistan with an area of approximately 50,000 square kilometres. The region includes the provinces of Bamyan and Daikundi and several adjacent districts in the provinces of Ghazni, Uruzgan, Wardak, Parwan, Baghlan, Samangan and Sar-e Pul. There are significant Sunni Hazara communities in the provinces of Badghis, Ghur, Kunduz, Baghlan, Panjshir and other areas in the northeast of Afghanistan. Ismaili Hazaras live in the provinces of Parwan, Baghlan and Bamyan. In addition, Shi’a as well as Sunni Hazaras are based in substantial numbers in several urban centres of Afghanistan, including Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif and Herat.
Traditionally, the majority of the Hazara community were involved in subsistence farming or working as peasants and artisans. In Afghanistan’s cities, Hazaras traditionally engaged in unskilled labour as they faced discrimination in education and public sector employment. This has contributed to their further stigmatization, reflected in the low rate of intermarriage between Hazaras and members of other groups. Systematic discrimination, as well as recurrent periods of targeted violence and enforced displacement, have led the Hazara community to lose much of their population and standing in the social hierarchy of modern Afghanistan.
Historical context
Shi’a Hazaras are historically the most discriminated ethnic minority group in Afghanistan and have long faced violence and discrimination. Partly, this is to do with religious faith; historically, the Shi’a minority, regardless of ethnicity, has faced long-term persecution from the majority Sunni population. During the reign of Amir Abdul Rahman (1880-1901), Hazaras suffered severe political, social and economic repression, culminating in a state-backed declaration of jihad or holy war against Hazaras from 1890 to 1893. Abdur Rahman Khan, a Pashtun, mobilized large contingents of government forces as well as ethnic and tribal militias in the war against Hazaras, promising them Hazara lands and men and women as slaves. Thousands of Hazara men were killed, their women and children taken as slaves, and their lands occupied and redistributed to Pashtun tribes. To strengthen the forces against Hazaras, he appealed to Sunni religious sensibilities to mobilize Tajiks and Uzbeks (both Sunnis) to help Pashtuns fight against the Shi’a Hazaras. Those Hazaras who survived the initial period of raids managed to escape to the north, while a significant number fled to then British India. Apart from Pashtuns, Uzbeks are also thought to have conducted slave raids on Hazaras in Bamyan and elsewhere.
Hazarajat was occupied by Abdur Rahman’s forces in 1893. Subsequently, he instituted a system of rule that systematically suppressed Hazaras. This repression ranged from issuing unwarranted taxes to assaults on Hazara land and harvests, massacres, looting and pillaging of homes, enslavement of Hazara children, women and men, and replacement of Shi’a clerics with their Sunni religious counterparts.
Although slavery was formally abolished by King Amanullah Khan in 1923, the persecution of Hazaras continued. Hazaras faced political, economic and social marginalization and the stigmatization of Hazara culture and identity. In Hazarajat, Pashtun nomads who participated in the conquest of the region in the 1890s progressively took control of the region’s pasturelands and dominated its trade and other economic activities with the rest of Afghanistan. The government also collected exorbitant taxes and kept the region economically undeveloped, with no investments in roads or other infrastructure. To mitigate the impact of this discrimination, many Hazaras concealed their identities to obtain state identification. As late as the 1970s, some Sunni religious teachers preached that the killing of Hazaras was a key to paradise. As a result of these policies, many Hazaras lived on the edge of economic ruin in Afghanistan.
Since the 1960s, Hazaras have actively campaigned against policies that discriminate against them, demanding equal rights as citizens of Afghanistan. Hazaras have formed their own political parties and participated in alliances with other parties to exert their influence over state policies in the country. The most significant Hazara political groups emerged during the resistance against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s. Several groups that appeared during this decade merged to form Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan (The Party of Islamic Unity of Afghanistan) in 1989. Following the collapse of the last pro-Soviet government in April 1992, the former anti-Soviet resistance groups, known as Mujahedin, were unable to agree on a new national government. These groups fought bloody civil wars over the control of Kabul and other parts of Afghanistan. Between 1992 and 1995, Abdul Ali Mazari led Hezb-e Wahdat to speak out at the international level for, and on behalf of Hazaras, putting their case to the UN and the international community. He unified the Hazara people by bringing together the many sections, forces and classes within Hazara and Shi’a society. Hezb-e Wahdat found itself in bloody conflicts with other mainly Sunni groups, including Jamiat-e Islami led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ittehad-e Islami led by Rasul Sayyaf. Jamiat, under Rabbani’s chief commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, launched retaliatory artillery attacks on Hizb-e Wahdat, killing many Hazaras. Amnesty International subsequently reported the killing of many unarmed civilians and the rape of many Hazara women. In February 1993, hundreds of Hazara residents in the Afshar district of western Kabul were massacred by government forces under the direction of Rabbani and Massoud, joined by Ittehad-i-Islami. The fighting saw the utter devastation of large areas of Kabul, particularly those inhabited by Hazaras.
Mazari was killed in mysterious circumstances while in Taliban captivity in March 1995, and Hezb-e Wahdat under the leadership of Karim Khalili joined a coalition against the Taliban until 2001. In the years that followed the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban in 1995, Hazaras faced particularly severe repression and persecution, including a series of mass killings in several provinces, leading to the deaths of thousands of Hazaras and forcing many to flee their homes. The largest massacres of Hazaras took place in the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif where the Taliban massacred several thousand predominantly Hazara residents in the city after it took control from the opposition groups.
A key moment in recent Hazara history is the destruction of the Bamyan Buddha statues by the Taliban in March 2001. The giant Buddha statues had long been central to the identity of the Hazara community. Hazaras celebrated the Buddha statues as heritage of a past civilisation in the heart of their homeland and had their own myths associated with the statues, unrelated to Buddhism. In some Hazara folklore, the statues are of a star-crossed couple Salsal and Shahmama, whose doomed love ends tragically in their deaths. The two remain forever separated, petrified in stone, looking out across the Bamyan valley.
In much of the international media this wanton destruction has been characterized as an assertion of the Taliban’s extreme reading of Islam that forbids representations of human features in art. What was missing in this media reporting were the views of local Hazaras who saw the targeting of the statues as an assertion of Taliban dominance over their culture and homeland. The destruction was, in fact, part of a larger campaign by the Taliban to suppress the rights and identity of Hazaras. In a private order to his commanders in 2001, Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar specifically instructed that Hazara cultural heritage be destroyed and the celebration of Persian New Year, Jashn-e Nouroz, be prohibited. The order also included forced land dispossession, anti-Shi’a propaganda and restrictions on Hazara women, who generally maintained more freedom in their society than other Afghan groups. After the fall of the Taliban, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) declared the remains of the destroyed Bamyan Buddhas a World Heritage Site. International debate has raged regarding whether the statues should be reconstructed or not. However, the discussions often disregard the fact that the sculptures are an integral part of Hazara culture and do not always consider the need to involve local communities in any future decisions concerning them.
Shi’a Islam was also recognized by the 2004 Constitution. Yet the influence of Shi’a personal laws has threatened that freedom. In 2009, the controversial Shi’a Personal Status Law was passed, stripping Shi’a women, many of whom are Hazara, of some of their basic rights enshrined in the Constitution, including allowing a husband to withhold basic sustenance from his wife for not having sex with him, restricting women from working without permission from their husbands, and denying women custody over their children. The law was reportedly drafted by a powerful Shi’a cleric and pushed through by conservative Shi’a community leaders, who did not adequately consult or protect the rights of Shi’a women.
The formal inclusion of a small number of Hazaras in positions of government did not address the structural discrimination and violence that ordinary Hazaras faced. Hazaras were discriminated against in public sector jobs as well as in the allocation of national budgets and international aid. These grievances led to the emergence of several waves of protest movements among Hazaras that demanded equitable allocation of resources, especially at the subnational level. In 2016, these protests led to the Enlightenment Movement (Junbesh-e Roshanaye), which was galvanized by a decision of the government of President Ashraf Ghani to divert a previously planned national electricity transmission line from the Hazarajat region.
Furthermore, Hazaras also became the targets of waves of violence by extremist groups, including the Taliban and the regional affiliate of the so-called Islamic State, known in this context as Islamic State – Khorasan province. For several years, the Taliban targeted Hazaras who were travelled along the roads that connected Hazarajat with Kabul and other urban centres. The main road between Hazarajat and Kabul became known as ‘Death Road’ due to the frequency of kidnappings and other deadly Taliban attacks on Hazaras that took place there in recent years. This violence on the main roadway further isolated and thereby stalled the development of Hazarajat, which requires labour and materials from Kabul to build facilities such as schools and clinics. These factors contributed to the large numbers of Hazara currently residing in Kabul, with many concentrated in one overcrowded area of Dasht-e Barchi, a vast informal settlement with limited public services.
The wave of extremist violence also hindered the Hazaras from peacefully protesting in the cities. On 23 July 2016, a rally of the Enlightenment Movement at Deh Mazang Square in Kabul was targeted by a suicide bomber, which killed 85 protesters and injured more than 400 others. It was the deadliest attack on civilians since 2002 and targeted Hazaras on the basis of their Shi’a religious identity. Other attacks include a December 2017 bombing that left at least 41 dead and another 80 injured in a Hazara neighbourhood of western Kabul and an assault in March 2018 that resulted in the deaths of at least nine people. As the Taliban gained control of Hazara areas, they also engaged in summary executions of Hazaras in the district of Malist in Ghazni and in Daikundi.
Current issues
Well before the Taliban took control of Kabul on 15 August 2021, Hazaras faced an escalating campaign of violence by the Taliban and Islamic State – Khorasan as well as structural discrimination by the government in Kabul. A wave of violence that deliberately targeted Hazara mosques, cultural and educational centres in Kabul and other provincial centres claimed the lives of several hundred Hazara civilians. Since coming to power, the Taliban have dismantled the constitutional order that provided the basic rights of the citizens of the country and have re-established the Islamic Emirate, which institutionalizes sectarian and ethnic discrimination towards Hazaras. Hazaras have lost virtually all influential posts in the government in Kabul, and the Taliban have appointed Pashtuns in positions of authority across Hazarajat.
Hazaras also suffer particularly seriously from other Taliban policies such as their restrictions on civil society, women’s rights and freedom of expression. Some minority women, including Hazara women, have traditionally enjoyed more freedom in their society than other ethnic groups and benefited considerably from post-2001 political and educational reforms. Civil society and independent media also provided important opportunities for Hazaras to voice their concerns against policies that discriminated against them. These channels are now largely unavailable to them.
Furthermore, the Islamic State – Khorasan have continued a campaign of violence to cause maximum casualties among Hazaras. After the Taliban came to power, the group claimed responsibility for attacks on Shi’a mosques in Kunduz and Kandahar that killed scores of predominantly Hazara worshippers. Several attacks on passenger vehicles in Hazara neighbourhoods of Kabul have claimed the lives of many others.
A key issue for the Hazara community is the general climate of impunity, whereby those who committed atrocities – both past and present – can evade justice. Hazaras are deeply concerned about the return of the Taliban to power, who they feel pose a direct threat to their community. The Taliban’s sectarian tendencies towards Hazaras are also likely to be reinforced by increasing ethnic tensions and incidents of violent clashes between Hazaras and nomadic tribes who, like the Taliban, are Pashtuns and claim rights to pasturelands throughout the Hazarajat region. Local Taliban have forcefully displaced hundreds of Hazara families from districts in the provinces of Daikundi and Helmand and have threatened Hazara communities with similar mass evictions in the provinces of Ghazni and Balkh. Pashtun nomads, who relied on government support since the late 19th century to claim the pasturelands of Hazarajat, have also returned to Hazara areas in large numbers.
Jogi and Chori Frosh are semi-nomadic communities belonging to the larger Jat ethnic minority who trace their origins to Tajikistan and Pakistan, respectively, and have historically engaged in seasonal migration around Afghanistan and into neighbouring states. In recent years, these communities have become increasingly sedentary, with more established populations scattered across Afghanistan and in greatest concentration on the outskirts of the main cities of the country’s north. Although there is little recent or reliable information available regarding the size of Jogi and Chori Frosh communities in Afghanistan, estimates suggest they make up an estimated 20,000-30,000 people, including approximately 1,500 Jogi families and 350 Chori Frosh families spread across northern Afghanistan. The accuracy of these figures is further complicated by the impact of decades of conflict: this has disrupted the migratory patterns of Jogi and Chori Frosh communities, leading some to flee to other countries temporarily or permanently, or move to other areas of Afghanistan, such as outside Kabul in Charahi Qambar, where they live amongst other internally displaced and nomadic communities.
The lack of information surrounding Afghanistan’s Jogi and Chori Frosh communities points to the relative invisibility of the challenges they face, which stands in contrast to the visibility of their distinct cultural practices. Like the majority of Afghans, Jogi and Chori Frosh are Sunni Muslims, predominantly speaking Dari but also community-specific dialects. Despite these commonalities, Jogi and Chori Frosh communities are discriminated against on account of their ancestral origins and related social and economic practices, including high levels of female labour participation rates, for which they are considered ‘outsiders’. This has contributed to their severe economic, social and political marginalization, a situation exacerbated by the frequent denial of recognition of their citizenship.
It is important to note that the labels used to refer to these communities have been externally assigned and carry with them negative connotations, having become synonymous with the social categories imposed on what are in practice, disparate groups. The term ‘Jogi’, for example, is often used in a derogatory manner as a synonym for ‘beggar’ and bears similarity with other exonyms such as ‘gypsy’. Nevertheless, Jogi and Chori Frosh communities have increasingly adopted these labels for self-identification: for this reason and due to the lack of appropriate alternatives to effectively refer to these communities, these labels will be used with due recognition of their shortcomings.
Although details regarding the background of Jogi and Chori Frosh communities in Afghanistan are scarce, their presence can be better understood in the context of the origins and migratory patterns of the broader Jat population. Jats are regarded as having originated from what is now the north of India and Pakistan, with some accounts suggesting that migration to areas of Central Asia dated as far back as the 10th century BCE as part of a population transfer between rulers in north India and Persia. Jat populations have since dispersed, and at present are spread across different areas of South, West, and Central Asia, including in Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. Constituting peripatetic populations, Jats engage in planned and systematic mobility as an adaptive strategy, often for the sale of goods and/or services, distinguishing them from pastoral nomads such as Kuchi.
Jats do not represent a single ethnic group: rather, those grouped together under the blanket label, ‘Jat’, have distinct identities, and generally would not self-identify according to this broader classification. This diversity is reflected by the migratory history of Jogi and Chori Frosh. Until part way through the 20th century, Jogi engaged in frequent back-and-forth migration between Tajikistan and Northern Afghanistan, which has since diminished, due significantly to the hardening of borders under the former Soviet regime in Tajikistan. Other members of the Jogi community indicate that they have historically migrated from other areas of the surrounding region, including Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. In contrast, Chori Frosh trace their more recent origins to Pakistan, to which they continue to travel frequently. These disparate histories impact their respective engagement in the economic and social sphere of Afghanistan: for example, female members of the Chori Frosh community commonly sell handicrafts and other goods from Pakistan at markets in northern Afghanistan.
Despite this heterogeneity, there are certain similarities between the Jogi and Chori Frosh communities, and amongst the broader Jat population, most notably a shared marginality. Jogi and Chori Frosh communities have been present in Afghanistan for many decades, though continue to occupy a liminal status within society, considered outsiders who have ‘come to Afghanistan’. While the precise origins of this discrimination are not clear, it has drawn on the physical features and social practices of these groups. Jats are generally understood as having ‘darker’ features, reflective of their assumed Indian origins, and have had their religious affiliations questioned. Also contributing to these processes of ‘othering’ have been endogamous practices of Jogi and Chori Frosh and their distinct linguistic dialects.
The view that these communities are exogenous to Afghanistan has persisted despite the fact that Jogi and Chori Frosh, as with other peripatetic peoples, have become more sedentary in recent years. This long-term trend of sedentarization is not a complete process and has been influenced by a range of factors. Amongst these include the cementing of state boundaries, processes of urbanisation, and decades of conflict and political instability ranging from the Saur Revolution (1978), Soviet Occupation (1979-1989), civil war (1992-1996), the Taliban regime (1996-2001) and the more recent war in Afghanistan since 2001. While some Jogi and Chori Frosh fought alongside the Mujahidin during the Soviet occupation, many fled the country for Tajikistan, Pakistan and Iran. For example, according to a 2010 study by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Chahari Qambar, an informal settlement outside Kabul, 98.3 per cent of Jogi living in the area had fled the country during conflict or the Taliban regime, having returned since 2003. Insecurity during these years disrupted the migration patterns and therefore livelihoods of these groups, with many choosing to settle in and around Afghanistan’s cities in search of improved economic opportunities and access to goods and services.
At the same time, improved transportation infrastructure and processes of urbanization have disrupted their previous role as intermediaries between rural areas and city centres between which they facilitated the transfer of information and petty trade.
These dynamics impacted the scale and nature of migration of Jogi, Chori Frosh, and other nomadic and semi-nomadic communities by increasing the costs associated with these practices: for example, the migration routes of Kuchi pastoral nomads became increasingly unsafe due to the presence of minefields. This has also had implications on the social organisation of these communities. When Jogi in areas such as Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan do engage in migration, they do so less frequently as a family unit, and instead select members to temporarily migrate to cooler areas during the summer, with the rest remaining behind.
In the current context, social and institutional discrimination against Jogi and Chori Frosh have coalesced, further entrenching their liminal status in Afghanistan. The challenges facing Jogi and Chori Frosh in Afghanistan are linked to the socio-political implications of decades of conflict, including the collapse of state structures, as well as influential forces both increasing the salience of ethnicity and pushing for greater homogeneity at various junctures. This is despite the fact that some positive measures have been introduced in recent years, including provisions in the 2004 Constitution stating that all Afghans should be treated equally and that measures should be taken to improve the livelihood of nomads.
A key issue facing Jogi and Chori Frosh is their lack of recognition as citizens of Afghanistan, not only socially, but also at an institutional level. The Afghan Citizenship Law passed in 2000 stipulates that an individual living in the country for over five years, aged over 18, and not having committed any crimes has the right to apply to citizenship. Yet their ability to secure a ‘tazkera’ – Afghanistan’s national identification card – is often constrained. Providing proof of citizenship, the tazkera is effectively a precondition to accessing social services, education, healthcare, and employment: it is also required to secure other documents, such as a passport, marriage certificate, or driver’s license, and also property title deeds for land ownership. While lack of a tazkera is not uncommon among many Afghans, what distinguishes the situation of Jogi and Chori Frosh from other communities is the absence of formal channels to access one should they need to do so. Indeed, the Ministry of Interior has in the past stated that in order for Jogi and Chori Frosh to secure the tazkera, parliament would first have to adopt a law recognizing them as citizens.
Notably, the specific challenges faced by Jogi and Chori Frosh have been recognized in the National IDP Policy introduced in 2014, which states that:’ MoI will cooperate with MOWA , MoLSAMD and MoBTA to see that assistance is given to… members of certain groups, notably the Kuchi, Jogi and Chori Frosh, who generally do not have Tazkera and who face special difficulties in acquiring them’. This represents a key policy change, as a result of insecurity and limited government capacity including lack of proper training of officials, yet implementation is lagging.
Contributing to these are the formal procedures involved in securing a tazkera. Applications require verification by a local elder registered as an official community representative that the applicant is part of the community, or that they are the child of a community member already registered and in possession of a tazkera. In addition to challenges presented on account of their mobility, it is likely local elders or other family members of Jogi and Chori Frosh applicants would also not possess any bureaucratic record. Furthermore, Jogi and Chori Frosh who have attempted to obtain documentation from government offices have reported discriminatory treatment.
Alternative avenues towards securing the tazkera have also been introduced, including attestations by two Afghans possessing tazkera as well as by the local police department. Similarly, under the Registration of Population Records Act 2014, Kuchi, or pastoral nomads, are able to secure tazkera in their seasonal place of residence, following verification of their identity by a Kuchi malik (or chief) and a close relative.
Although official statistics are not available, surveys have shown that as a result of their non-recognition and linked bureaucratic processes, the majority of Jogi and Chori Frosh remain undocumented. According to a 2011 UNICEF study, in 80 per cent of Jogi homes in the surveyed areas of Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul, no one is registered or has any form of identification. More recent research from 2015 has highlighted that of those Jogi who do possess tazkera, 83 percent have Kuchi tazkera. Further, gendered dynamics regarding tazkera possession amongst the broader population are replicated amongst Jogi, with virtually no recorded female registration rates.
While peripatetic communities such as Jogi and Chori Frosh display considerable adaptability and resilience, the pace of change, non-recognition, and related bureaucratic obstacles have led to low levels of education, severe poverty, and substandard settlement conditions for these communities. Access to education is a particularly acute issue for Jogi communities, with lack of documentation and attendant challenges in securing land ownership being key obstacles towards admission. The 2011 survey commissioned by UNICEF in Mazar-e-Sharif highlighted that 83.9 per cent of Jogi children were out-of-school, as compared to a rate of 47.2 per cent amongst the non-Jogi urban poor.
This contributes to a lack of economic opportunities, with many Jogi and Chori Frosh engaging in economic activities such as begging, the sale of small items, and fortune-telling in order to subsist. These activities and their economic marginality feed into pre-existing stereotypes about these communities, including rumours of prostitution and child abduction. Contributing to this is the high level of female engagement in the labour market – in some areas with rates tenfold higher than non-Jogi women. This, alongside the factors previously noted, including their physical features and language, and in addition to their residence in white tents in rural areas, has reinforced their status as ‘outsiders’ in Afghanistan. Surveys have suggested that their income is half that of neighbouring urban poor, and they experience considerably higher levels of food insecurity. Therefore, in contrast to the assumption that more sedentary lives in urban areas would improve access to state institutions, public services, and employment opportunities for these communities, Jogi and Chori Frosh have been further locked into a low social standing within Afghan society. Unlike the Kuchi population, they are not afforded any formal opportunities to advance their political participation.
Nevertheless, during the tenure of former President Hamid Karzai, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) submitted a letter detailing the situation of the Jogi community, including their inability to access national identification documents. The AIHRC reportedly received a positive response, including from the Population Registration Department, which indicated that Jogi should be able to receive the tazkera. The response from provincial officials has, however, been mixed. Whilst some tazkera were issued to Jogi individuals, the response in some locations has reportedly diverged from the official line and reflects a continued unwillingness to provide Jogis with tazkera. This highlights ineffective coordination between the various levels of government, but also the persistence of the discriminatory belief that these groups do not belong to Afghanistan.
As a priority, a path towards citizenship must be made clearly available to Jogi and Chori Frosh communities, and any inconsistency between central policy and local implementation addressed, thereby dealing with issues regarding their non-recognition. It is crucial that this is coupled with initiatives to support Jogi and Chori Frosh in securing national identification documents. These initiatives will need to work at various levels: for instance, trainings and awareness raising amongst government officials; efforts to support Jogi and Chori Frosh knowledge of and access to tazkera through providing information and resources; and advocating for more appropriate and accessible registration processes. This should include advancing the implementation of the National IDP Policy, including the provision focused on improving access to tazkera for Jogi and Chori Frosh.
Linked to this, there is a need for further examination of initiatives at the local level to address the absence of documentation amongst these groups to assess their efficacy, recommend improvements, and replicate these efforts if appropriate. This includes Balkh province, wherein 2014 a memo was distributed amongst officials instructing them to provide national identity cards to Jogi if approved by selected representatives of the community linked to the Balkh Provincial Council. Reports from government officials having indicated distribution of over 1,000 national ID cards, yet these figures are contested by local organizations, highlighting the need for further assessment.
Finally, efforts should be made by key actors operating in Afghanistan, including the Afghan government and the AIHRC, to conduct updated research regarding the nationality status of Jogi and Chori Frosh in Afghanistan, and any other semi-nomadic communities that may be affected by statelessness. The absence of research and up-to-date information surrounding these communities contributes directly to the relative invisibility of this issue. This should be disseminated widely to those working in areas in which these communities reside, including humanitarian and development organizations who can include this in the design and content of their activities.
Profile
Kuchi means ‘nomad’ in the Dari (Persian) language. Kuchis are Pashtuns from southern and eastern Afghanistan. They are a social rather than ethnic grouping, although they also have some of the characteristics of a distinct ethnic group. Though traditionally nomadic, many have been settled in northwestern Afghanistan, in an area that was traditionally occupied by Uzbeks and Tajiks, after strong encouragement by the Taliban government. Nowadays only a few thousands still follow their traditional livelihood of nomadic herding. Others have become farmers, settled in cities or emigrated. The largest population of Kuchis is probably in Registan, the desert in southern Afghanistan.
Tribes are formed among the Kuchis along patrilineal lines. A clan is composed of a core family, their offspring and their families. The leader of the tribe, the Khan, is responsible for the general well-being of the community, for governing the group and for representing it to visitors. Tribes live communally, and on becoming too large separate in order to facilitate more efficient management. Typically, there are three types of Kuchis: pure nomads, semi-sedentary and nomadic traders. The majority are semi-sedentary, living in the same winter area year after year. The purely nomadic Kuchis have no fixed abode and are dependent on animals for their livelihood; their movements are determined by the weather and the availability of good pasturage. Traders constitute the smallest percentage of Kuchis; their main activity being the transport of goods. The semi-pastoral Kuchis are gradually tending towards a more sedentary way of life. The majority do so because they can no longer support themselves from their livestock.
The Kuchis constitute an important part of Afghanistan’s cultural heritage. For centuries, they have migrated across the country in a search of seasonal pastures and milder weather. They were the main traders in Afghanistan, connecting South Asia with the Middle East. The livestock owned by the Kuchis made an important contribution in the national economy. They owned about 30 per cent of all the sheep and goats and most of the camels. Traditionally they exchanged tea, sugar, matches etc. for wheat and vegetables with settled communities. They also acted as moneylenders and offered services in transportation along with additional labour at harvest time. Kuchis have been greatly affected by conflict, drought and demographic shifts. Therefore, it is only a small number of Kuchis who still follow their traditional livelihood of nomadic herding. Despite their history and their traditional resources, the chronic state of instability in Afghanistan has left them among the poorest groups in the country.
Historical context
With the development of the road system in Afghanistan in the 1950s and 1960s and the formation of road transportation companies with fleets of trucks, the traditional Kuchi camel caravan gradually became obsolete, greatly impacting the income and lifestyle of the community. The situation for the Kuchis became even more tenuous during the prolonged periods of armed conflict and during the droughts of 1971-1972 and 1998-2002. These droughts are estimated to have caused the deaths of 75 per cent of Kuchi livestock. Furthermore, the combination of the intensive bombing campaigns by the US-led coalition as well as the spread of landmines during the 23 years of conflict decimated Kuchi herds, taking away their major source of income. Fighting and control by different warlords also often blocked their migratory routes.
The relation between settled communities and Kuchis has historically been peaceful and based on exchanges of goods and services. Real tensions commenced when the Kuchis started settling on the land since their nomadic lifestyle was being disrupted. During the Taliban regime, Kuchi nomads (being of Pashtun origin) were encouraged to settle on lands that were already occupied by other ethnic groups. The lack of overall policy regarding land tenure and pasture rights by the authorities created prolonged disputes over the land and resources between settled Afghans and Kuchis. The traditional system of pasture rights seems to have been eroded and replaced by the power of the gun. Thus, although many Kuchis still hold documents indicating their rights to use pastures and parcels of land (some of which date back a century or more) their current value is undermined and their land rights not recognized by the government when handling disputes.
In recent years there have been increasing tensions between Kuchis and Hazaras over access to land, with periodic clashes between the two groups in central Wardak and Bamyan provinces. In 2008, Hazara communities went out into the streets, threatening to take up arms against Kuchis if they entered either of the provinces.
Clashes also took place in 2010 in western Kabul, when Kuchi refugees attempting to resettle on their ancestral lands clashed with local Hazara residents. The fighting continued for several days and led to casualties among both communities. The government sought to resolve this dispute by resettling the Kuchi community in the ruins of the Darul Aman palace in Kabul, where they were forced to live in destitution for months. Further clashes with other ethnic groups, especially Hazaras, as well as the authorities have occurred in the years since then. The Kuchis’ situation will remain precarious until the government develops adequate solutions, both short and long-term, for Kuchis lacking access to land.
The relation between settled people and Kuchis has historically been peaceful and based on exchanges of goods and services. The tensions began to escalate when Kuchis started settling on the land, as their nomadic lifestyle became increasingly disrupted. During the Taliban regime, Kuchi nomads (being of Pashtun origin) were encouraged to settle on land that was already occupied by other ethnic groups. The lack of an overall official policy regarding land tenure and pasture rights created prolonged disputes over lands and natural resources between settled Afghans and Kuchi communities. The traditional system of pasture rights seems to have been eroded and replaced by the power of the gun. Thus, although many Kuchis still hold documents indicating their rights to use pastures and parcels of land (some of which date back more than a century) their current value is undetermined.
Depending on the region, Kuchis make up a large proportion of internally displaced people (IDPs). For instance, according to one UNHCR report in 2008, they made up 60 per cent of IDPs in two regions in the Punjway and Maywand districts of Qandahar in southern Afghanistan. With 90 per cent of their livestock lost and water remaining scarce, the report questioned whether the return was at all feasible or sustainable. Thus, the real challenge is the creation of livelihood opportunities in Kuchi areas of origin, complemented by projects aiming for longer-term reintegration. This reintegration needs to take into account the fact that Kuchis are generally facing a higher degree of nutritional and food security risks than others – due to the impact of both conflict and drought. In addition, any support to Kuchi returnees must also involve and support local settled communities in order to avoid tensions and conflict in the future.
Current issues
Life for Kuchis is difficult, especially for Kuchi women. Male and female roles, as in other segments of traditional Afghan society, are rigidly adhered to, with the men tending livestock while the women hold the major responsibility for child-rearing, and are completely responsible for food and water preparation and for sewing and weaving clothes and tents.
Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Kuchis have been discriminated against on the basis of their perceived alignment with the Taliban. Many ended up in rudimentary IDP camps near Herat or Kandahar or isolated in refugee camps in Pakistan. Kuchis who have livestock are often unable to drive their flocks to their traditional summer grazing pastures in the central highlands. Very little of the foreign assistance extended to Afghanistan by the international community has aided the Kuchis. Few assistance agencies work in the insecure areas in which they are located, and most donors emphasize short-term economic and humanitarian aid rather than the longer-term assistance the Kuchis need to rebuild their herds and gain access to essential services and reintegration programmes for those who have been displaced. As a result, most Kuchis today remain jobless and illiterate.
Although due to their nomadic lifestyle Kuchis were never really involved in the politics of the country, they have played a key role in Afghanistan’s post-Taliban political revival. Kuchis gained their own constituency and were allocated 10 seats of the 249 seats, seven for men and three for women, in the National Assembly of 2005. These and other positions filled by Kuchis, however, tend to be dominated by settled Kuchi people – those who are no longer engaging in nomadic lifestyles. Recently and informally settled or semi-nomadic Kuchis are largely neglected. They report being forcibly settled by the government, having no means to sustain their livelihoods in permanent settlements, and denied access to health and education. Most lack birth certificates or identity papers, which are required to access these services. Many Kuchis reportedly live in informal settlements on the outskirts of Kabul.
At the same time, Kuchis who have more recently adopted a sedentary lifestyle on the periphery of major cities have similarly faced discrimination. Urban Kuchis have typically lacked access to ‘serviced’ areas of the city and have instead lived on the outskirts, often occupying infertile land or, as has been the case near Qandahar, residing long-term in IDP camps. Such marginal and precarious living conditions have not only disadvantaged those living in such settlements but have also fuelled increasingly widespread negative perceptions of Kuchis, further undermining their social status within Afghanistan.
An Independent Commission of Kuchi Affairs (IDKA) was created under the Presidential Office in 2006 to help realise the rights of the Kuchi community, and particularly to serve as an interface for state relations with nomadic Kuchis. Unfortunately, disputes within the commission have reportedly slowed any significant progress.
Profile
Nuristanis arrived in Afghanistan fleeing the eastward spread of Islam. They speak a unique Indo-European-language. Nuristanis were conquered by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan in 1895-96 and were obliged to abandon their ancient religious beliefs in favour of Islam. They reside mainly in the east of the country – between the Pashtun tribes of Kunar, Kalash in Pakistan’s Chitral, and Tajiks of Badakhshan in the north. Nuristan (‘land of light’) is located on the southern slopes of the Hindu Kush mountain range and is spread over four valleys, with each valley having its own distinct language/dialect: Kati, Waigali, Ashkun and Parsun.
Nuristan has very little arable land, the vast majority of the territory being covered by forest. The main base of the economy is animal husbandry – mostly goat-herding. While maize and barley are grown in small quantities, the Nuristani people survive mainly on subsistence agriculture, wheat, fruit and goats. Very few Nuristanis have had access to education. Yet, among those who have travelled to Kabul and been able to gain access to schools, some have gained prominence as well-known figures in the army and the government in Kabul.
Historical context
The Nuristanis’ scattered settlement is another result of Amir Abdul Rahman’s late-nineteenth-century expansionism. During his rule, what was then called Kafiristan (‘kafir’ meaning non-believer as Nuristanis did not convert to Islam until the twentieth century) was renamed as Nuristan (‘land of light’) after the forced Islamization of the community. Nuristanis are still sometimes referred to as ‘Kafir’. Some Nuristanis claim to be descendants of Alexander the Great and his forces.
Nuristani men and women follow a strict division of labour with the men working in livestock herding, while the women work on grain production or irrigated terraces.
The province was the scene of some of the heaviest guerrilla fighting during the 1979-89 Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Nuristan is still used as a route by Taliban into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan.
Nuristan’s distinctive cultural heritage was under considerable threat during the period when the Taliban controlled Kabul. A collection of life-size wooden sculptures dating back to the 18th and 19th centuries was smashed by the Taliban in 2001 in their effort to destroy artistic expressions of the human form, as well as evidence that parts of Afghanistan had in fact followed other faiths than Islam until relatively recently. The collection had been brought back by the forces of Amir Abdul Rahman and housed at the National Museum. The statues depict ancestors as well as animistic and polytheistic divinities. Although some remain lost, others were hidden away by museum staff. Fourteen sculptures could be carefully restored and incorporated in an inaugural display at the newly reopened museum in 2004.
Current issues
The Constitution recognizes Nuristanis as one of the national minorities entitled to Afghan citizenship. However, Nuristan remains isolated and poverty-stricken, and due to the lack of regional institutions, there is a widespread lawlessness. As a geographically remote region, it has been difficult to establish a central government presence, and after it was virtually abandoned by NATO in 2009, many areas of Nuristan have come under the control of the Taliban. A Nuristani provincial governor commented that Nuristan province has been largely neglected by NATO and the central government as a symptom of long-term neglect and discrimination of the Nuristanis as an ethnic minority, who have not been able to represent themselves adequately in Kabul. In 2017, fighting between Taliban and ISIS erupted in the province, following a concerted effort by ISIS to recruit followers there.
Neglect from the central government as well as continuing violence and insecurity has produced extremely poor health, maternal health and education indicators. In March 2017, measles outbreaks reportedly killed 70 children in Nuristan province and schools were closed due to fear of an imminent Taliban siege in May. Community members reported a serious lack of qualified teachers and education facilities.
Profile
Panjshiris are not always classified as a separate community because they are considered as falling within the Tajik ethnic grouping. However, they display certain distinct characteristics from their ethnic cousins that often identify them as a specific minority in their own right. It can be speculated that their name comes from the Panjshiri valley, where they were living. They practice Sunni Islam and speak a language known as Panjshiri, which is a dialect of Dari (Farsi dialect). They inhabit the mainly mountainous areas north of Kabul in and around the Panjshir valley.
Like Nuristanis, they live at relatively high altitudes in mountainous areas with limited access to land. They have traditionally derived their livelihood from animal husbandry. With increasing migration to Kabul for work, Panjshiris have gradually begun to provide a source of unskilled labour that is only second to the Hazaras. A significant number have also traditionally worked in semi-skilled professions, as drivers and mechanics.
Socially and politically, Panjshiris fall into the same category as other suppressed ethnic groups such as the Hazaras and Nuristanis, with very few people in high-ranking positions in the army and the government in Kabul.
Historical context
Panjshiris played an important role in providing resistance against the Soviet occupation. Like the Hazaras and Nuristanis, they initially remained independent, without affiliation to any political party during the war with the Soviet Union. However, Panjshiris gradually achieved prominence in the resistance under the command of Ahmad Shah Masoud, when their army came to control vast areas of northern Afghanistan.
During a period of heightened ethnic tensions under the Taliban in 1998, non-Pashtun Afghans were denied free movement within the country, solely based on ethnicity. Many Panjshiris, mainly men and boys as young as 12, along with Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks were captured by the Taliban guards, sent to Qandahar and imprisoned. Due to their distinctive ethnic features, they could not hide from the Taliban and as a consequence suffered greatly.
After the fall of the Taliban regime, Panjshiris, along with other Tajiks, formed the core of the Northern Alliance and gained power in some important ministries, as well as some control of the military. A number of Panjshiris have however been articulating the view that the community should give up some of the control if it is to achieve a more diverse and ethnically equally representative government.
Current issues
Pansjhiri participation in politics has increased dramatically in recent times, and members of the community have been able to run as presidential candidates. The current politics of Afghanistan shows that the Panjshiris have taken a great share of administrative and political power since the overthrow of the Taliban, which has raised some concerns given how small a minority they represent. This accusation has been particularly targeted at their pervasive role in the Afghanistan’s intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS).
Profile
Though their exact number is uncertain and as with other communities are contested, previous estimates have suggested that Uzbeks (9 per cent) and Turkmen (3 per cent) make up a total of around 12 per cent of the population, Both Uzbeks and Turkmen live in the northern part of Afghanistan. In origin, Turkmen, also called Turcoman, Turkman or Turkomen, come from the Turkic-speaking tribes that emerged from Oghuz Khan, back in the seventh and eight centuries. Turkmen are Sunni Muslim of Hanafi tradition and are closely related to the people of modern Türkiye to the west, and identical to the majority Muslim population of their Central Asian kin state across the border to the north. Originally a purely tribal society, they have, in the more recent years adopted a semi-nomadic lifestyle.
Uzbeks are also a Turkic-speaking ethnic group. They are believed to have emerged in Central Asia in the third century BCE, and some claim to be possible descendants of Genghis Khan. They indicate Turkic ancestry and are, in the vast majority, Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi tradition, which reflects a primarily cultural rather than religious identity. Their language is Uzbek and although it is their own Turkish dialect, it is closely related to the one spoken by the Uyghur Muslim minority of Xinjiang, China.
Uzbeks and Turkmen have tribal identities that still largely define the structures within their respective societies, and this is reflected both in their social as well as political life. Both groups have had an influence on Afghan culture mainly through sport and music.
Economic status
Turkmen and Uzbeks occupy the greatest share of Afghanistan’s arable land in the north, and are mostly farmers by occupation, growing grain and vegetables. In addition, they produce crafts and animal by-products that bring considerable supplementary income to their communities. Cotton production has also added significantly to the wealth of these two groups. However, a very important part of their economy and fame is based on the making of carpets, which is mainly considered women’s work. Because of their relative prosperity, Uzbeks and Turkmen have not been dependent on the central government and have not made a concerted effort to garner political influence in the past. However, the economy of northern Afghanistan was badly damaged by the Taliban conquest of 1998. The consequences of this were not only subjugation and repression, but importantly also resulted in the closure of the border with Uzbekistan by the Uzbek government resulting in significant loss of trade, and thereby reduction in the socio-economic independence of the groups.
Historical context
The Turkmen of Afghanistan originate from amongst the Turkic tribes of Central Asia who arrived in Afghanistan as refugees in the 1920s and 1930s along with many thousands of Uzbeks, to escape repression by the Soviet Union because of their participation in the unsuccessful Basmachi Revolt. Generally, the population in the region is not a product of recent immigration but of the way borders were drawn between the Republics during the early Soviet period.
In order to quell Pashtun dominance, the Soviets, during their occupation of Afghanistan adopted a divide and rule policy, especially in the northern areas where Uzbeks had a significant presence. This was relatively effective in stemming the influence of Pashtuns, who were the main resistance against them in Kabul. In keeping with their policy, Uzbeks and to a lesser extent Turkmen were given a degree of autonomy and trained to fight against the Mujahidin in case of attack. For the first time in the history of Afghanistan, except during periods of anarchy and rebellion, Uzbeks along with Tajiks and Hazaras exercised full administrative and political autonomy.
Political representation
After the Soviet withdrawal, during the civil war in Afghanistan, Uzbeks, along with Hazaras and Tajiks actively sought adequate political representation at the centre, whilst retaining the form of autonomy they had become accustomed to, in their respective areas. Uzbeks did not have their own political organization until General Abdul Rashid Dostum defected from the Najibullah regime and, with his control over the northern provinces, became a self-appointed spokesman for the rights of Uzbeks in Afghanistan.
In contrast to Uzbeks, Turkmen sought to avoid confrontation by remaining neutral throughout the decades of conflict in Afghanistan. As a result, they had no powerful leaders or warlords to represent them politically during and in the aftermath of the civil war and the modern rebuilding process. Accordingly, they remained apart from the social and political mainstream of Afghanistan. They have been historically excluded from decision-making processes and ignored by the ruling class. They have had no representation to uphold their rights and have never generally been properly represented in the overall administration structures.
Current issues
In the Constitution, both Uzbeki and Turkmani are granted status of ‘third official language’ along with some other minority languages and both communities are given recognition as ethnic groups in Afghanistan.
Uzbeks were part of the Northern Alliance, which fought against the Taliban regime. Thus, after the fall of the Taliban, Uzbeks have gained even more influence in the military and political life of Afghanistan.
Recently, the Taliban has started to recruit more heavily from ethnic minorities, expanding their territories in the north. Ethnic Turkmen and Uzbeks have been recruited from the northwestern Faryab province and northern Jowzjan province, in particular. Qari Salahuddin Ayubi, an ethnic Uzbek, was the Taliban’s ‘shadow governor’ in Faryab, but was later killed by a NATO airstrike in 2015. The sense of discontent with the central government and sentiment that it cannot provide adequate protection is driving at least some members of minorities to the Taliban. In other cases, the lack of protection from the central government has driven Turkmen to form new militias instead, to fight off the renewed advance of the Taliban.
ABOUT AFGHANISTAN
Main minority or indigenous communities: no reliable current data on ethnicity in Afghanistan exists, though surveys have pointed to some rough estimates of the population. However, previous estimates have put the population at Pashtun 42 per cent, Tajik 27 per cent, Hazara 9 per cent, Uzbek 9 per cent, Turkmen 3 per cent, Baluchi 2 per cent and other groups making up the remaining 8 per cent.
Main languages: Dari (Farsi dialect, 50 per cent of the population) Pashtu (35 per cent) . Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen) and other minority languages such as Aimaq, Ashkun, Baluchi, Gujari, Hazaragi, Kazaki and Moghili, Pashai, Nuristani and Pamiri (alsana).
Main religions: Islam 99.7 per cent (Sunni 84.7 – 89.7 per cent, Shia 10-15 per cent, and other smaller sects), Sikhism, Hinduism, Judaism.
Afghanistan has not conducted an official census since 1979. After a failed attempt in 2008, another census began in 2013 and was expected to take six years before it would be completed. This recent census process will not include questions on language or ethnicity, for fear that the results will be too politicized and lead to another unsuccessful census. Some of the first results from Bamyan province, where the minority Hazaras are in a majority, put the population figures at less than half of official estimates, leading to accusations of number manipulation.
More than 3.5 million Afghan refugees live outside the country, mainly in Pakistan and Iran. More than 700,000 Afghan refugees returned in 2016, many under considerable pressure from Pakistan. However, Afghanistan’s lack of capacity to absorb large numbers of returnees and the risk that many will end up in a situation of displacement upon arrival has led numbers to drop. In November 2017, the UN refugee agency UNHCR recorded only 50,000 registered returnees from Pakistan during the first three quarters of the year, compared with 370,000 the year before. At around the same time, increased civilian casualties led Amnesty International to warn that the EU should stop forcibly returning rejected Afghan asylum-seekers. The number of returns had tripled between 2015 and 2016, with nearly 10,000 having been returned in 2016 alone. Meanwhile, a study published by the Norwegian Refugee Council in January 2018 concluded that three-quarters of returning refugees ended up in situations of displacement, with 72 per cent having been displaced at least twice.
Afghanistan’s political life has always been dominated by ethnic Pashtuns, who are thought to make up more than a third of the population. Pashtuns are overwhelmingly Sunni with the exception of the Pashtun Turi tribe who are Shi’a.
Significant numbers of the Tajik community are also Sunnis, apart from some Imami Shi’a Tajiks living in western Afghanistan, and the Badakshan Tajiks who are Ismailis.
The majority of ethnic Hazaras are Shi’a (Imami Shi’a) though the Hazaras of Shibar are Ismaili Shi’a with a small minority who are Sunni.
There are small Hindu and Sikh communities, estimated in 2016 at about 900 persons, but their numbers are thought to have dropped significantly over the past decades due to emigration. Following the parliamentary rejection of a presidential decree proposing a reserved seat for Hindus and Sikhs in December 2013, political representation of these groups remained limited in 2014. However, in a historic appointment, in May 2014 the previous Afghan government selected a representative from the dwindling Hindu community for the diplomatic rank of ambassador for the first time. Nevertheless, despite managing to secure positions in parliament by appointment, Sikhs and Hindus continue to report being pressured to convert and facing disruptions to funeral and cremation ceremonies by local officials. Socially ostracized, Sikhs living in Kabul reportedly face economic hardship, with many refusing to conduct business with them, but also due to land grabs in areas in which Sikhs have historically resided. In addition to daily economic and social discrimination – sometimes manifesting as physical and verbal abuse – freedom to practise their religion has also been curtailed. Kabul was once home to eight Sikh places of worship or gurdwaras, but only one remains today.
Considerable intermarriage, particularly between the Pashtuns and other groups has somewhat blurred ethnic distinctions among communities. There has also been mixing between Tajiks and later Mongolian and Turkmen migrants, and some between Hazaras and Uzbeks.
Afghanistan is still largely a tribal society, divided into many tribes, clans and smaller groups. Considerable variation in the types of terrain and obstacles imposed by high ranking mountains and deserts, account for the country’s marked ethnic and cultural differences.
The country’s population reflects its location with the presence of several national minorities. The main ethnic groups are dispersed throughout the country as follows: Pashtuns, the majority group, are concentrated mainly in the south and south-east but also live all over the state; Tajiks inhabit mainly the north and north-east, and the Kabul region; Hazaras live in the centre (Hazarajat) and in Kabul; Uzbeks in the north; Aimaq in the west; Turkmens in the north; Baluchis in the west and south-west; and Nuristanis in the east.
Nomadic ethnic groups in Afghanistan continued to be sidelined politically and economically. Some communities, such as Kuchis, have managed to play a key role in post-Taliban politics, but these are mostly settled members of the Kuchi community. Recently settled or semi-nomadic Kuchis are largely neglected. They report being forcibly settled by the government, having no means to sustain their livelihood in permanent settlements, being denied access to health and education. Most lack birth certificates or identity papers, which are required to access these services. Many Kuchis live in informal settlements on the outskirts of Kabul.
The already perilous situation for marginalized ethnic and religious communities in Afghanistan became even more severe during 2021, when the Taliban insurgency escalated its campaign and ultimately retook control of the country, 20 years after they were ousted from power. In May, a car bomb was detonated near the Sayed Al-Shuhada school, in the neighborhood of Dasht-e-Barchi, and two more bombs exploded when students rushed out in panic. At least 85 people were killed and 147 wounded. The attack very clearly targeted members living in the area belonging to the country’s long persecuted Shi’a Hazara minority. No group claimed responsibility, but the attack was widely thought to be the work of Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), an ISIS affiliate.
Worse was to follow. Trump’s successor, US President Joe Biden, moved ahead with the withdrawal of US and allied forces, announcing his own timeframe of having completed the process by 11 September 2021. The fact that the US was indeed pulling out gave renewed vigour to the Taliban insurgency, with one provincial capital after another falling to them during the summer of 2021. The Taliban claimed control over Kabul on 15 August, when President Ghani was reported to have fled the country.
The final days before the US’s withdrawal were marked by chaotic scenes at Kabul airport, as thousands of Afghans desperately tried to secure places on the last planes leaving the country. These included employees of the US and allied military forces, embassies and aid agencies, as well as many vulnerable members of what until just days before had been a vibrant civil society, including journalists, human rights defenders and minority activists. Their perilous position was underscored by a massive suicide bomb attack in front of the airport’s gates, killing 170 of those hoping to get on board a flight. The attack was claimed by ISKP.
Amnesty International reported that 13 Hazara were killed at the end of August by Taliban fighters in Daykundi province. Nine were former members of the Afghan army and had surrendered; another victim was a 17 year-old girl. Amnesty had previously received reports of 9 Hazara being killed in Ghazni province in July; three of the victims had been severely tortured.
A sequence of suicide bombings followed, first on 8 October in Kunduz and then on 15 October in Kandahar. Both targeted Shi’a mosques and led to large numbers of casualties, with reports of at least 72 people killed in the first incident and at least 63 people killed in the second. ISKP has claimed responsibility for both. Thousands of Hazara as well as Sikhs and Hindus – all communities who have been actively targeted by Taliban fighters over the years – are known to have fled to Pakistan.
During the 20 years when the Taliban were out of power, the human rights situation in Afghanistan has remained precarious and many problems such as corruption, insecurity and weak governance have persisted. Nevertheless, there have also been significant gains for the rights of women and girls, with many able to access education, employment and other opportunities that were denied them during the Taliban’s rule before. Activists fear that, despite assurances from some Taliban that their government would be more inclusive, most of these hard won gains could be quickly and permanently reversed under Taliban rule. The situation is likely to especially dangerous for women from some minority communities, such as Hazaras, who have traditionally enjoyed more freedom in their society than other ethnic groups. In the post-2001 period, they benefited considerably from various political and educational reforms. Women activists, human rights defenders, NGO workers and journalists are also a high risk of being harassed, detained and even killed with the Taliban in power.
Environment
Afghanistan is a landlocked, arid, mountainous and sparsely populated country, with an area of 647,500 square kilometres, bordered by Iran to the west, Pakistan to the south and east, the People’s Republic of China to the far north-east and the Central Asian republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to the north-east.
History
Afghanistan’s modern history has been one of conflict and civil war. The country’s first Constitution was drafted in 1923. However, the constitutional monarchy that was introduced in 1964 came to an end with the overthrow of King Zahir Shah by the then Prime Minister (later President) Mohammad Daoud in a coup in 1973. President Daoud was himself overthrown by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a small Marxist-Leninist party which took power in a coup supported by the Soviet Union in April 1978. However, PDPA’s ideology was rejected provoking resistance. This led to a civil war, which intensified after the entry of Soviet troops in December 1979.
The Soviet invasion resulted in the establishment of a communist regime in Kabul and ushered in years of further conflict which persisted until the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from the country in 1989, following the Geneva Accords of 1988. As reported in documents submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly, the Soviet occupation was characterized by an arbitrary rule. During the occupation, the United States began to covertly and overtly support opposition to the regime which consisted of armed Islamist groups, through military and financial aid to fight against the Soviet and Afghan governmental forces. Regional powers including Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia each supported their own factional groups, as ethnic awareness and consequent tensions mounted.
According to UN reports, during the Soviet occupation, the country suffered serious damage, particularly in the intellectual sphere thereby damaging the foundation for the future. Torture was the most frequently used tool of the regime. Massive summary executions regularly took place and when, in September 1979, the President of the time, Nur Mohammed Taraki, was ousted by his deputy, Hafizullah Amin, a list of 12,000 persons who had been executed in prison was posted on the walls of the Ministry of the Interior.
Post-Soviet invasion
After the withdrawal of Soviet forces in February 1989, a civil war commenced between the Soviet-supported government of President Mohammad Najibullah and the various Afghan factions supported by the US and known as the Mujahadin (holy war fighters), who had fought against the Soviet troops until their withdrawal. But with the departure of the common enemy, differences submerged during the war re-emerged and Mujahadin groups began to fight among themselves.
The civil conflict rapidly acquired an ethnic dimension as people from various localities fled their homes, changing the population dynamics of the state. As a result, the population of various localities fluctuated in the numbers of one or other ethnic group. Under intense pressure, the Najibullah’s regime finally collapsed when Abdul Rashid Dostum (an army general under the Soviets) and his Uzbek militia switched allegiance from the Kabul regime to the Mujahidin, who entered Kabul in April 1992.
The end of the communist regime yielded the discovery of three common graves, at Pol-i-charkhi in the suburbs of Kabul next to the central prison, and in the provinces of Bamyan and Herat. The government was convinced that further investigations would reveal other such mass graves. The occupation and ensuing war led to more than 1 million deaths and forced 6 million people out of a total population of 16 million to seek exile in neighbouring countries. Further 2 million persons were internally displaced, several tens of thousands were disabled by anti-personnel mines, and the number of orphans and other persons left without families ran into the tens of thousands.
The UN offered to mediate in this conflict between various factions of the Mujahadin, proposing a peace plan, although this effort collapsed in April 1992. One result of the UN’s efforts was the transfer of power to the Mujahadin faction representing the Tajiks from the north, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, who became President of Afghanistan in July 1992. President Rabbani’s government was supported by Ahmad Shah Masoud, a former guerrilla commander and prominent Tajik representative. Strong opposition was mounted by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Hezb-e Islami faction of the Mujahadin, which represented the Pashtun population.
Violent attacks also occurred between the Hazara opposition Hizb-e Wahdat and Mujahadin leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittehad-i-Islami. Some of the other parties joined the fighting, leading Hizb-e Wahdat to attack Rabbani’s Jamiat-e Islami positions. Rabbani’s chief commander Massoud launched retaliatory artillery attacks on Hizb-e Wahdat, killing many Hazaras. Amnesty International subsequently reported the killing of unarmed civilians and rape of Hazara women. In February 1993, hundreds of Hazara residents in the Afshar district of West Kabul were massacred by government forces under Rabbani and Massoud, joined by Ittehad-i-Islami.
This civil war between the various Afghan factions caused untold misery in the state. While many people sought to rebuild their lives, thousands of refugees also arrived from the borders. There were severe abuses of human rights. Between April 1992 and August 1994, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, 13,500 people were killed and 80,000 wounded in Kabul alone. It was estimated that more children under the age of five died of disease in Afghanistan than in any other country during that period.
As in most conflicts, women and children were among those worst affected by the civil war. Strict purdah meant that many women spent most of their lives in seclusion, and cultural norms further limited their access to health services, education and training. With family structures broken, and men killed or absent, Afghan women took on heavy additional burdens, often including sole responsibility for children and disabled relatives.
Mujahidin in power
The incoming Mujahidin government inherited merely the symbols, not the instrumentalities of a state. The army was also fragmented, leading to different groups claiming power across the country. The conflict between the resistance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, who occupied the centre of Kabul, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar the leader of Pakistan-backed Hezb-e Islami escalated and continued until 1996.
During this time the education and health infrastructure of the state were severely undermined. UNICEF reported more than 1.5 million children died from malnutrition and lack of healthcare. Afghans of all ethnic, religious and linguistic backgrounds were the primary victims of this war, though more than 3 million refugees subsequently returned to the country through the government’s involvement in two tripartite agreements, with Pakistan and UNHCR, and with Iran and UNHCR respectively.
Taliban rule
From 1994, Pakistan supported the ‘anti-modernist’ militia known as Taliban. The word ‘taliban’ signifies ‘students’ with the professed initial ideology of the movement geared towards making its members closer followers of the Qur’an. Disillusioned with the continued instability, former Mujahidin coalesced around a new leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, originally from Qandahar. The Taliban were constituted overwhelmingly of Pashtuns and recruited students from Deobandi madrassas in Pakistan. Non-Afghan radicals also joined the Taliban. The Deobandi movement was founded in 1867 in India and started out as a revivalist Islamic movement, but is now seen as orthodox and ultra-conservative. Their madrassas, or Islamic schools, are run in many countries around the world.
Effective on the battlefield, the Taliban quickly gained ground. In 1995, they took control of the western city of Herat, thereby cutting strategic supply links between Iran and the government in Kabul. In September 1996, Massoud was forced to retreat from Kabul, and the Taliban took control. In 1997, the Taliban named the country the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and set about enforcing a harsh vision of Islam in areas under their control. Taliban policies severely restricted the movement and dress of women, as well as required men to grow beards and refrain from Western clothing; enforcement was through the notorious Ministry of Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice – including through the application of corporal punishment. Massoud reconstituted the opposition Northern Alliance with the northern Panjshir Valley as his base.
Meanwhile, Osama bin Laden, the leader of the extremist al-Qaeda movement, had returned to Afghanistan and developed close ties with Mullah Omar. Al-Qaeda fighters fought alongside Taliban. Originally from Saudi Arabia, bin Laden had previously fought with the Mujahidin. In the wake of a-Qaeda’s attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the US on 11 September 2001, Afghanistan found itself bearing the brunt of US government retaliation. The Taliban, accused of sheltering the instigators of the attacks, collapsed in the face of a sustained US-led bombing campaign of the country. Despite the assassination of Massoud by suicide bombers posing as journalists just a couple of days before the 11 September attacks, the Northern Alliance forces entered and recaptured Kabul with US support.
Bonn Agreement
The initial steps towards rebuilding the country were taken through the signing of a peace agreement – the Bonn Agreement signed between various factions in Bonn, Germany in December 2001. The internationally brokered agreement sought to create a governance structure for Afghanistan after the demise of the Taliban. The agreement sought to put in place transitional institutions pending the establishment of permanent government institutions.
This created the Afghanistan Interim Authority (AIA) and an emergency Loya Jirga (or ‘grand assembly’), which were given the mandate to decide upon an Afghanistan Translational Authority (ATA). A constitutional Loya Jirga consisting of representatives of the various ethnic groups within the state was held within 18 months of the establishment of the ATA, in order to adopt a new Constitution. Hamid Karzai served initially as interim leader and then as elected President from December 2001 to September 2014.
A new Afghan National Army was created through presidential decree. This army recruited across the ethnic divides as a symbol of the transitional authority’s commitment to ethnically balanced institutions under civilian control. During this period an effective police force was also established.
Despite the introduction of some element of democracy in Afghanistan the country continued to be plagued by violence and insecurity, including as a result of retaliatory Taliban attacks.
Refugee and internal displacement
Afghanistan’s problems intensified with the rapid return of many Afghan refugees who had left the state during decades of war. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that almost 2 million refugees returned to Afghanistan from abroad in 2002 alone while 700,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) moved back to their places of origin. This figure subsequently dropped in the following years as the heightened security tensions and the destitute conditions led to further displacement.
Continued challenges and the resurgence of the Taliban
Growing international opposition to the continued involvement of NATO troops in Afghanistan, as well as increasing insecurity in many parts of the country, resulted in the announcement of a temporary surge in US troops after the beginning of Barack Obama’s presidency in 2009, followed by a steady withdrawal of forces in the years that followed until the formal end of NATO operations in December 2014.
Tensions surrounding issues of ‘identity’ in Afghanistan came to the fore during the 2014 election, which saw the politicization of identity along predominantly ethnic lines. Although Ashraf Ghani, the eventual victor, avoided using his tribal name for official purposes in the wake of his election, during the campaign his identity was mobilized in efforts to appeal to Afghanistan’s majority Pashtun voters. Meanwhile, Ghani’s first vice president, former Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum – who fled the country in May 2017 following accusations of the torture and rape of a political opponent – at the time warned minority Uzbek and Turkmen tribes in Baghlan province they would be considered ‘traitors’ if they did not vote for Ghani. However, the election also provided an opportunity for minorities to challenge Afghanistan’s hierarchical political system, with Hazaras playing a particularly prominent role in the election – a reflection of their improved status over the last decade. Although the Hazara vote was split, the majority of voters lent their support to Abdullah Abdullah – who is of mixed Pashtun and Tajik ethnicity but is identified with the latter – and who represented a vote for change in the eyes of many.
During this period, however, the root problems of corruption, ethnic division and exclusion failed to be addressed. Continued violence, particularly for minorities such as Hazaras, persisted as Taliban militants appeared to gain in strength. This period, from 2015 onwards, saw the first incidents by ISIS-affiliated groups as well, with attacks targeted against security forces, officials and also minorities.
Further governance challenges and stalled negotiations
Presidential elections took place in September 2019. A consultative peace loya jirga, or grand tribal council, gathered in Kabul at the end of April 2019 in order to discuss the peace process with the Taliban. Boycotted by key figures, including chief executive Abdullah Abdullah, it was perceived by many as simply a stage in President Ghani’s forthcoming re–election campaign. However, the gathering was significant in reaffirming the still fragile gains that have been made by the country when it comes to women’s rights and human rights more generally. Of the roughly 3,200 delegates, some 900 women participated; 13 of the 52 working committees were headed by women – a clear step forward in women’s participation. The 2019 presidential elections gave the incumbent, President Ashraf Ghani, a narrow lead; however, the results were disputed by his opponent, Abdullah Abdullah. The subsequent political crisis was protracted, leading ultimately to Ghani being sworn in as President. In May 2020, the two opponents signed a power-sharing deal whereby Abdullah was tasked with leading the government’s peace talks with the Taliban.
Meanwhile, in February 2019, the United States and the Taliban began their own negotiations in Doha, Qatar to bring about an end the conflict. The American side was motivated by a desire to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. However, minorities such as the Hazara feared that any deal which gave the Taliban a say in government would lead to a return to the targeted killings and other persecution that they faced before the Taliban were toppled in 2001. US President Donald Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban in February 2020, according to which US and allied troops would pull out by May 2021.
Little was done to address Afghanistan’s deeply entrenched culture of impunity. The government of former President Hamid Karzai adopted a transitional justice plan in December 2006, but no further action was taken and it was essentially quashed by an amnesty law passed by the Afghan parliament in 2007. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) conducted a comprehensive 800-page mapping of war crimes and crimes against humanity which had been committed from 1978 to 2001; however, lack of government support led the AIHRC to withhold its release.
Sadly, the fight against impunity received a clear setback in April 2019 when the International Criminal Court’s pre-trial chamber turned down the chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda’s request to investigate. The request had encompassed the crimes of members of the Taliban and the Afghan government, as well as the US military and Central Intelligence Agency. After the request was announced in 2017, more than 6,000 people, along with, collectively 1,690 families and 26 villages, came forward and offered their testimonies and support. However, both the Afghan and US governments expressed their vehement disapproval of the request and insistence that they would not cooperate with any investigation. As a result, while noting that the chief prosecutor had provided sufficient evidence to draw the conclusion that potential cases would prove admissible, the judges felt forced to conclude that an investigation would not meet ‘the objectives listed by the victims favouring the investigation’ and thus ‘at this stage would not serve the interests of justice…’
The Taliban take power
Following failed negotiations, the Taliban insurgency escalated dramatically in the summer of 2021. With the withdrawal of US forces already confirmed by the Doha Agreement signed by then US President Donald Trump in February 2020, Taliban fighters were able to advance rapidly across the country and seize a series of key cities and strongholds with relatively little resistance. This culminated in the fall of Kabul on 15 August 2021, two decades after the Taliban were removed from power in 2001.
Governance
In terms of the relations between the different ethnic groups within the state, it can be stated that the Pashtuns have largely dominated Afghan politics though other ethnic groups, notably the Tajiks, have, at various stages of history also maintained a strong political influence. Many attribute the worsening of ethnic relations and the emerging tensions between the groups to the Afghan-Soviet war which is said to have changed society significantly.
Jurisprudence concerning blasphemy and apostasy has been used to harass religious minorities. Blasphemy can be punishable by death if committed by a male over the age of 18 or a female over the age of 16, ‘who is of sound mind’. The accused is given three days to recant, or otherwise, face death by hanging. Conversion from Islam is considered apostasy and can be punishable by death. Although there have not been any recent prosecutions, representatives of minority communities state that the fact that the provisions exist mean that they are hesitant to express their faiths publicly. Individuals who convert from Islam are particularly fearful of retribution by both the government and their families. A fatwa issued in 2007 declared the Baha’i faith a blasphemous deviation from Islam.
The Constitution of Afghanistan came into force on 4 January 2004. It recognizes Afghanistan as an Islamic Republic and as an ‘independent, unitary and indivisible state’. The Constitution further gives official recognition to the following ethnic groups: ‘Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkman, Baluch, Pachaie, Nuristani, Aymaq, Arab, Qirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujur, Brahwui and other tribes.’ Pashtu and Dari are recognized as the official languages, but grants ‘third official language’ status to areas where Uzbeki, Turkmeni, Pachaie, Nuristani, Baluchi or Pamiri language speakers are in the majority. All these languages are to be effectively adopted and developed by the government, with publications and broadcasting proposed to be in all the spoken languages of Afghanistan. The educational curriculum, however, is envisaged as being unitary and based on Islam and ‘national culture’. Article 22 contains a basic non-discrimination clause, but it does not specify any conditions on which discrimination may be based.
With regard to religious minorities, it is worth noting that it is the constitutional chapter on ‘The State’ that protects religious freedom rather than the chapter on ‘Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens’. Article 2 recognizes Islam as the state religion and that, ‘followers of other religions are free to exercise their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of the law.’ This sole clause has been called inadequate as there are no provisions of the law that protect the freedom of religion or belief for minorities. Indeed, jurisprudence establishing harsh penalties for blasphemy and apostasy have been used to harass religious minorities. Blasphemy can be punishable by death if committed by a person of sound mind who has reached the age of majority, namely over the age of 18 for males or over the age of 16 for females. The accused is given three days to recant, or otherwise, face death by hanging. Conversion from Islam is considered apostasy and can be punishable by death. A fatwa issued in 2007 declared practitioners of the Baha’i faith as a blasphemous deviation from Islam.
Article 84 of the Constitution mandates that women should hold 50 percent of the seats in the House of Elders (upper house) and Article 83 requires each of the 34 provinces to send two female delegates to the House of the People (lower house). The 2010 parliamentary elections saw 27.7 percent of the seats held by women, more than ever before; the percentage of women members of parliament has remained steady since then.
The situation for many women in Afghanistan has improved significantly over the last decade, with an increase in female access to education, women’s representation in parliament, armed and police forces and civil society. However, there are many women who have still not been given the opportunity to garner a full understanding of their rights, and freedom of expression among women (for instance on issues concerning women’s issues and free choice of dress) remains minimal in more rural areas given the extent of intimidation by armed factions and political or religious leaders.
The law on the elimination of violence against women was passed by Presidential Decree in 2009. But even as of 2017, it had not yet been approved by parliament, which is necessary in order to enshrine its status in Afghan law. In 2016, some members of parliament were advocating changes that threatened to undermine the law, including to remove provisions related to women’s shelters, minimum age of marriage, and punishments for domestic assault. Use and implementation of the law lags behind. While violence against women and girls is increasingly being catalogued and reported, the law is rarely applied. The law does not have any provisions for the potential intersectional discrimination faced by minority women and does not mention ethnicity or religious identity.